(UNFICYP). Despite the absence of Turkish Cypriots from the government, the international community, with the sole exception of Turkey, continued to recognize the Greek Cypriot rump government as the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots who withdrew during the hostilities to fortified enclaves, which made up some three per cent of the territory of Cyprus, established their own governmental structures: first, the Temporary Turkish Cypriot Administration and, later, the Turkish Cypriot Administration. Matters came to a head in July 1974 when, in response to a violent coup d'état instigated by Greece and aimed at uniting the island with the Greek motherland, Turkish armed forces landed in northern Cyprus in order to protect Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish intervention led to the de facto partitioning of the island and a large scale population transfer across the ceasefire line. On 13 February 1975, a Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was declared in the 36.4 per cent of the island occupied by some 35,000 Turkish troops. This new Federated State was intended to form the Turkish Cypriot wing of a Federal Republic of Cyprus, which would consist of both communities. However, this did not materialize. On 15 November 1983, the Turkish Cypriots declared the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as a sovereign independent State. The new State was recognized by Turkey on the same day. The international community, on the other hand, rejected this unilateral declaration of independence and continued to recognize the Republic of Cyprus as the only State in Cyprus and its Greek Cypriot-controlled government as the government of the whole island, despite the fact that this government had not exercised any control over northern Cyprus since 1974. Several attempts aimed at solving the Cyprus conflict and achieving a reunified State on the island have failed. On 24 April 2004, simultaneous referenda were held in both parts of the island on UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's plan for a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem. While 64.91 per cent of Turkish Cypriots approved the so-called Annan Plan, 75.83 per cent of Greek Cypriots rejected it. 2 With the entry of a divided Cyprus into the EU, the Member States imported the Cyprus conflict into the Union. To make matters worse, when the European Council decided at its meeting in Brussels on 17 December 2004 to open accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005, it linked Turkey's accession process with the Cyprus problem. Accession negotiations with candidate countries are held in the framework of an inter-governmental conference consisting of all Member States of the EU, including the Republic of Cyprus. One of the principal obstacles that Turkey must overcome on its way to Europe thus concerns its non-recognition of the Republic of Cyprus. As the EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, pointed out: ''If you want to become a part of a family, you have to recognize all members of that family, otherwise you cannot become a member of that family''.
I. Turkey's way to Europe and the Cyprus problem I.A. EU -Turkey relations
Turkey's relationship with the EU began in July 1959 when the government of Turkey lodged an application to join what was then the European Economic Community (EEC). The EEC's response to this first application was to propose the creation of an association between the EEC and Turkey until such time as circumstances permitted Turkey's membership. This association was established with the signing of an Association Agreement between the EEC and Turkey (Ankara Agreement) in September 1963. 4 The Ankara Agreement envisaged the progressive establishment of a customs union which would bring the two sides closer together in economic and trade matters. It was supplemented by an Additional Protocol, signed in November 1970, which set out a timetable for the abolition of tariffs and quotas on goods circulating between Turkey and the EEC. 5 There was a temporary freeze in Turkish -EEC relations as a result of the military coup d'état in Turkey in September 1980. Following the multi-party elections of 1983, relations were re-established and Turkey applied for full membership on 14 April 1987. The European Commission's opinion on Turkish membership, endorsed by the European Council in February 1990, confirmed Turkey's general eligibility for membership but deferred an in-depth analysis of its application. On 31 December 1995, the customs union between the European Community (EC) and Turkey, which had been envisaged for more than thirty-two years, finally entered into force. 6 In November 1998, the European Commission submitted the first of its regular annual reports on Turkey's progress towards accession. 7 At the Helsinki European Council of December 1999, Turkey was officially recognized as a ''candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States''. 8 In March
2001, the European Council adopted the EU-Turkey Accession Partnership in which it identified as a short-term priority that Turkey should strongly support the UN Secretary General's efforts to bring to a successful conclusion the process of finding a comprehensive settlement to the Cyprus problem. 12 The European Council agreed that accession negotiations with Turkey would be based on a framework for negotiations, and that the negotiations would be conducted in an inter-governmental conference with the participation of all Member States and Turkey. The Council, acting unanimously on a proposal by the Commission, would lay down benchmarks for the provisional closure and, where appropriate, for the opening of each chapter of the negotiations; depending on the chapter concerned, these benchmarks would refer to legislative alignment and a satisfactory track record of implementation of the acquis communautaire as well as obligations deriving from contractual relations with the EU. The European Council further stressed that ''these negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand'', thus leaving the question of whether Turkey would ever achieve full membership open. 13 On 29 June 2005, the European Commission presented to EU Member States its ''rigorous negotiating framework'' for accession negotiations with Turkey, in which it emphasized that support for efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework and fulfilment of the obligations under the customs union would be required of Turkey. 14 After Turkey had fulfilled all the conditions laid down at the Brussels European
Council meeting, the accession process was formally started on 3 October 2005.
I.B. Turkish non-recognition of the Republic of Cyprus
A major hurdle in the accession process is Turkey's non-recognition of the Republic of Cyprus.
With the break-up of the partnership government in December 1963, Turkey ceased to recognize the Republic of Cyprus. 15 In an interview on 1 January 2005, Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül said: ''There is an EU member that we do not recognize''. 16 On another occasion he stated: ''Direct or indirect recognition of the Cyprus Republic is out of the question for Turkey''. 17 These statements have caused some confusion. Commentators have claimed that certain actions to be taken by Turkey in the cause of the accession process would imply its political, diplomatic or de facto recognition of the Republic of Cyprus. For example, it was said that sitting at the conference table with the twenty-five EU countries, including the Republic of Cyprus, would imply de facto recognition of the Greek Cypriot State; 18 the opening of Turkish ports to Greek Cypriot ships and aircraft would mean the de facto recognition of the Greek Cypriot government; 19 or signing an Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement extending the customs union to the Republic of Cyprus would signify de facto recognition of the Greek Cypriot Administration. 20 In order to assess the effect of any such action on the question of recognition, it is important to establish what exactly Turkey does not recognize. Turkey does not deny the statehood of the entity controlled by the Greek Cypriots, or the status of the Greek Cypriot-controlled government as the government of this State in southern Cyprus. 21 However, Turkey does object to the claim of the Greek Cypriot-led government to be the government of the original ''Republic of Cyprus'', which comprised the entire territory of the island and which represented the whole of Cyprus, including the Turkish Cypriots. The Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, in accordance with the practice of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, confined himself to publishing and transmitting these declarations to the other parties to the treaties. 42 A parliamentary question on the legal significance and effects of these declarations put to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe went unanswered. 43 The ministers simply noted that the registration of the Turkish instruments of ratification did not in any way affect the status of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus within the Committee of Ministers. 44 The effect of the declarations attached by Turkey to its instruments of ratification depends on their legal status. The declarations seem to be more than a mere restatement of Turkey's legal position on the Cyprus issue. They are not just an expression of Turkey's refusal to recognize the Greek Cypriot Administration's claim to sole representation of the Republic of Cyprus. Rather, Turkey wants to exclude any contractual relationship with the Greek Cypriot Administration. The declarations also do not qualify as interpretative declarations as their aim is not to interpret the terms of the treaty, but to exclude their application in the relations between two parties thereto. 45 It is disputed whether such declarations may qualify as reservations as stipulated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). 46 Such declarations have been referred to as ''reservations relating to non-recognition''. There are several reasons for not categorizing a statement of non-recognition as a reservation, even if it purports to exclude the application of the treaty in the relations between the State formulating it and the non-recognized entity. 47 State''. The declaration in question does not relate to the exclusion of the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty but to the exclusion of a party to the treaty. It also seems very difficult to apply the provisions in Article 20 VCLT on the acceptance of and objection to reservations to such a declaration. In practice, such declarations have, however, been treated like reservations. 48 Their legal effect thus depends on the individual treaty and, in particular, on whether the statement excluding the application of the treaty in relation to the nonrecognized entity is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. 49 In the case of most multilateral treaties, it is not a precondition of the treaty that it uniformly applies between all the parties. 50 Reservations ratione personae are not excluded per se. What we have proposed is that Turkey accept the Republic of Cyprus as one of the 25 members of the EU. This is required for the start of the accession talks. However this does not mean a recognition that the Cyprus government in the south represents the whole island. This will only be an acceptance that Cyprus is one of the member countries of the EU. What we expect is that Turkey sign the protocol that extends the Ankara Treaty to the 25 member countries. of the TEC is generally understood as referring to their territory in accordance with international law. 83 As no proviso has been added to Article 299(1), the TEC applies in principle to the entire island of Cyprus. This is also shown by the fact that the contracting parties felt it necessary to suspend the acquis communautaire in northern Cyprus. Suspension, however, presupposes application. It would thus not be possible for Turkey to accede to the TEC without, at least implicitly, recognizing the Republic of Cyprus' claim to the whole island. 2005, Turkey signed the Protocol through an exchange of letters, the Turkish Ambassador to the EU did not just return the signed Protocol but three pieces: the cover, the Protocol and the declaration. On the cover it said: ''We are sending the attached protocol; our thoughts on the matter are contained within the declaration''. 87 The ''Declaration by Turkey on Cyprus'', which also bears the signature of the Turkish Ambassador to the EU, reads as follows:
1. Turkey remains committed to finding a political settlement of the Cyprus issue and has clearly demonstrated its resolve in this regard. Accordingly, Turkey will continue to support the efforts of the UN Secretary-General towards achieving a comprehensive settlement which will lead to the establishment of a new bi-zonal partnership State. A just and lasting settlement would greatly contribute to peace, stability and harmonious relations in the region. 2. The Republic of Cyprus referred to in the Protocol is not the original partnership State established in 1960. 3. Turkey will thus continue to regard the Greek Cypriot authorities as exercising authority, control and jurisdiction only in the territory south of the buffer zone, as is currently the case, and as not representing the Turkish Cypriot people and will treat the acts performed by them accordingly. 4. Turkey declares that signature, ratification and implementation of this Protocol neither amount to any form of recognition of the Republic of Cyprus referred to in the Protocol; nor prejudice Turkey's rights and obligations emanating from the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance, and the Treaty of Establishment of 1960.
Turkey reaffirms that its existing relationship with the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus remains unchanged by becoming a party to the Protocol. 6. Pending a comprehensive settlement, the position of Turkey on Cyprus will remain unchanged. Turkey expresses its readiness to establish relations with the new partnership State which will emerge following a comprehensive settlement in Cyprus.
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According to Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül, the Turkish side ''put a lot of care and attention into both content and style so as to leave no room for misunderstandings''; it considered the protocol and the declaration as ''a single unit''. 89 This was echoed in a press statement from the Turkish Foreign Ministry which said that the ''official declaration [. . .] legally constitutes an integral part of our signature and letter''.
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At its extraordinary meeting on 25 July 2005, the Council's Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) had already decided that ''the Presidency will react to any declaration by Turkey by a Presidency statement using established EU language, also making it clear that the Council will consider any formal counter-declaration later''. . Acknowledge signature by Turkey of the Ankara Agreement Protocol. Regret that Turkey felt it necessary to make a declaration regarding the Republic of Cyprus at the time of signature.
. Make clear that this declaration is unilateral, does not form part of the Protocol and has no legal effect on Turkey's obligations.
. EU expects full, non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol, and the removal of all obstacles to the free movement of goods, including restrictions on means of transport. Turkey must apply the Protocol fully to all EU Member States. The EU will monitor this closely and evaluate full implementation in 2006.
. Recalls that, as long as Turkey has not implemented its contractual obligations with the EU, negotiations on the relevant chapters cannot be opened.
. Recall that the Republic of Cyprus became a Member State of the European Union on 1st May 2004. Underlines that the EU recognizes the Republic of Cyprus, only, as a subject of international law.
. EU underlines the importance it attaches to the de jure normalisation of relations between Turkey and all EU Member States, as soon as can be achieved.
. Notes Turkey's continuing commitment, in its declaration, to support the efforts of the UN Secretary General to bring about a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. Agrees that a just and lasting settlement will contribute to peace, stability and harmonious relations in the region.
. The EU will remain seized of all the issues outlined above and will review them in Accordingly, the EU underlines the importance it attaches to the normalisation of relations between Turkey and all EU Member States, as soon as possible. 6. The Council will ensure a follow-up on the progress made on all these issues in 2006. 7. In the context of this declaration, the European Community and its Member States agree on the importance of supporting the efforts of the UN Secretary General to bring about a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem in line with relevant UNSCRs and the principles on which the EU is founded, and that a just and lasting settlement will contribute to peace, stability and harmonious relations in the region.'' Resolutions] and the principles on which the EU is founded''. This is in marked contrast to Turkey's vision of ''a new bi-zonal partnership State'' as envisaged in the Annan Plan. 105 In particular, the requirement that any settlement has to be ''in line with the principles on which the EU is founded'' favours the future negotiating position of the Greek Cypriots in the inter-communal negotiations on a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. 106 Several of the Turkish Cypriots' positions in the inter-communal negotiations, which found their way into the Annan Plan, are difficult to reconcile with the acquis communautaire. For example, the Turkish Cypriots demanded restrictions on the right of Greek and Greek Cypriot nationals to move freely, establish themselves and acquire property in the Turkish Cypriot part of the ''United Cyprus Republic''. 107 In future negotiations, the Greek Cypriots will be able to reject such Turkish Cypriot proposals simply on the ground that they are incompatible with the acquis. This is already foreshadowed in a letter to the UN Secretary General, dated 7 June 2004, in which the leader of the Greek Cypriot community, Tassos Papadopoulos, justified the rejection of the Annan Plan on the basis of serious doubts as to its compatibility with the acquis. 108 In a statement in November 2005, Papadopoulos declared that any future ''settlement plan for Cyprus must be in line with the principles and rules of the EU''.
109
According to the EC and its Member States, the Turkish declaration ''is unilateral, does not form part of the Protocol and has no legal effect on Turkey's obligations under the Protocol''. Turkey, on the other hand, takes the view that the European counter-declaration is ''of unilateral and political nature''. 110 This raises the question as to the legal character of the two declarations. The unilateral statements of the two sides could qualify as a reservation and an objection to it, as simple or conditional interpretative declarations, or as mere general statements of policy. The name for the statement chosen by its author is irrelevant for its qualification. In order to establish the legal character of a statement, one must look behind the title given to it and seek to establish its substantive content. The statement is to be interpreted in good faith, in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms, in the light of the treaty to which it refers. The decisive criterion for drawing a distinction between the various statements is the legal effect their authors intend to produce. 111 Both reservations and conditional interpretative declarations seek to produce a legal effect on the treaty or certain of its provisions. By making a reservation, a State purports to exclude or modify the legal effect upon it of certain provisions of the treaty or certain specific aspects of the treaty as a whole. 112 By making a conditional interpretative declaration, a State seeks to make a specific interpretation of a treaty provision a condition for its consent to be bound by the treaty, and thus seeks to impose its interpretation on the other contracting parties. In both cases, the object of the statement is to limit or eliminate an obligation which otherwise would be incumbent on the declarant under the treaty. In paragraph 3 of its declaration, Turkey states that it ''will continue to regard the Greek Cypriot authorities as exercising authority, control and jurisdiction only in the territory south of the buffer zone [. . .] and will treat the acts performed by them accordingly''. This is reminiscent of a reservation having territorial scope (reservation ratione loci ), purporting to limit the effect of the Additional Protocol, i.e. the application of the Ankara Agreement, to the territory south of the buffer zone. According to Article 1(3) of the Additional Protocol, however, the Ankara Agreement applies only to the southern part of the island. The Turkish declaration thus does not exclude the application of the Ankara Agreement to a territory (i.e. the territory north of the buffer zone) to which it would be applicable in the absence of such a declaration. Consequently, the declaration by Turkey does not produce any legal effect on the territorial scope of the treaty. In fact, the text of the declaration does not purport to limit or eliminate any obligation under the Ankara Agreement. In response to the EU counter-declaration, Turkey expressly confirmed that ''it would fulfil all commitments emanating from the Ankara Agreement and the Additional Protocol to all EU Member States in a non-discriminatory fashion''.
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To the extent that paragraph 3 clarifies Turkey's position on the meaning of the term ''Republic of Cyprus'', the declaration may be qualified as a simple interpretative declaration. 114 Turkey's interpretation of this term is not binding on the other parties to the treaty and co-exists with the interpretation offered by the EC and its Member States in paragraph 4 of their counter-declaration. In the case of a dispute between the contracting parties as to the meaning of ''Republic of Cyprus'', it will be for the tribunal called upon to settle the dispute to establish the meaning of the term in accordance with Article 31, 32 VCLT. The Turkish declaration and the EU counter-declaration qualify as part of the context of the terms of the treaty and may be taken into account in accordance with Article 31(2)(b) VCLT as instruments related to the treaty. The requirement that the instrument was ''accepted by the other parties'' does not mean that the parties have to agree on the substance of the instrument, but that they accept its connection with the treaty.
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The rest of the Turkish declaration simply reaffirms Turkey's long-standing position on the Cyprus problem.
116 Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan described the declaration as ''an announcement of what is already known''. 117 While the declaration relates to the Additional Protocol and the Ankara Agreement, it does not purport to produce any legal effect on these agreements. In particular, the statements of non-recognition and non-prejudice in paragraph 4 are simply a ''precautionary step'', 118 a means to safeguard Turkish rights and interests with regard to matters outside the treaty. In this respect, the Turkish declaration is comparable to the declaration made by the Federal Republic of Germany upon signature of the Treaty of 12 August 1970 between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Moscow Treaty). 119 Turkey's declaration may be characterized as a general statement of policy that does not have any legal effect on its obligations under the treaties concerned.
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The situation would have been different if Turkey had included in its declaration a reference to the contentious issue of whether the Ankara Agreement requires the opening of Turkish ports and airports to ships and aircraft registered in the Republic of Cyprus. According to Turkey ''ports and airports are in the services sector'', and are thus not covered by the Ankara Agreement.
121 Such a statement would have amounted to an interpretative declaration, in the same way as the statement of the EC and its Member States in paragraph 3 of their counter-declaration that the full, non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol requires ''the removal of all obstacles to the free movement of goods, including restrictions on means of transport''. In the same way that the Turkish declaration is not binding on the Community and its Member States, the EU's interpretative counter-declaration is not binding on Turkey.
Apart from paragraph 2 of the EU counter-declaration which, it is submitted, is a correct assessment of the legal effect of the Turkish declaration, all other paragraphs of the counter-declaration are essentially general statements of policy that do not have any effect on the substance of the Additional Protocol or the Ankara Agreement. It may thus be concluded that the Turkish declaration is mainly a political declaration that required a political answer in the form of the EU counter-declaration. While not binding on Turkey, the EU counter-declaration is binding on the EC and its Member States and may be relied upon by the Republic of Cyprus against the European institutions and the other Member States. The example of the Moscow Treaty of 12 August 1970 is instructive in this respect. 130 On the occasion of the signature of the Treaty, the German government had delivered a ''Letter on German Unity'' to the Soviet Foreign Ministry in which the German government stated that, in its view, the Treaty did not conflict with its ''political objective'' of German reunification. 131 This statement was to be seen against the background of Article 3 of the Treaty, which provided that the parties ''undertake to respect without restriction the territorial integrity of all States in Europe within their present frontiers'' and that they ''regard today and shall in future regard the frontiers of all States in Europe as inviolable such as they are on the date of signature of the present Treaty, including the Oder-Neisse line which forms the western frontier of the People's Republic of Poland and the frontier between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic''. The Act of the German Parliament that gave effect to the Treaty covered not only the Moscow Treaty itself, but also the ''Letter on German Unity'' and notes exchanged between the federal government and the governments of the three western powers before signature of the Treaty. All these documents were published along with the Act and the text of the Moscow Treaty in the Federal Law Gazette. 132 The German instrument of ratification handed to the Soviet government on 3 June 1972 explicitly referred to this Act by the German Parliament. The Supreme Soviet's assent to the Moscow Treaty, on the other hand, was confined to the reproduction of the Treaty text, without mentioning the Letter on German Unity or the notes exchanged between the Federal Republic of Germany and the three western powers. Neither the declarations of the German government nor their incorporation into the Act of Parliament had any legal effect on the Treaty. 133 While these declarations also safeguarded German rights and interests at the international level with regard to matters outside the scope of the Treaty, they were mainly made for domestic, political and legal reasons. One reason for including the Letter on German Unity and the other documents in the national law-making process was to secure a majority in Parliament for the Treaty. 134 Another objective of the declaration was to protect the German government against legal proceedings for violating the German constitution, 135 and, in particular, the precept spelled out in the preamble of the Basic Law that ''the entire German people are called upon to achieve in free self-determination the unity and freedom of Germany''. Similarly to the German declaration, the Turkish The Greek Cypriot Administration continues to implement discriminatory economic measures against the Turkish Cypriot Community in several fields. In this framework, the ports in Northern Cyprus remain declared 'illegal' and closed to shipping of all countries. Ships and captains which call at these ports are subjected to prosecution in Southern Cyprus. This Greek Cypriot policy is directed against not only the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus but also against Turkey and harms Turkish economic interests. Taking this situation into consideration, it is decided to prohibit the entry and use of Turkish ports by ships carrying the Greek Cypriot flag. This decision, taken in exercise of Turkish sovereign rights over its internal waters and ports, will become effective as of 14 May 1987. 158 Subsequently, the Turkish government extended these restrictions to all ships calling at ports in southern Cyprus, irrespective of the owner or flag of the vessel. 159 In the latest incident on 22 February 2006, the Cypriot-flagged container ship Able F was refused permission to enter the Turkish port of Mersin. 160 As one of the major flag States, these restrictions have been of the utmost concern to the Republic of Cyprus. 161 The Turkish restrictions have had a damaging effect on the maritime economy of Cyprus, with container traffic to its ports dropping substantially, and many ships being registered under other flags. The Government of the Republic of Cyprus has tried to use Turkey's aspirations to EU membership, and, in particular, the Ankara Agreement, as leverage to get these restrictions lifted. It is argued that neither side is entirely correct in its assessment: neither does the customs union require Turkey to abolish all existing restrictions, nor is the issue of access to ports and airports completely outside the reach of the Ankara Agreement and the Additional Protocol of 1970. It is true that the customs union is confined to the free circulation of industrial goods and processed agricultural products originating in the Community or in Turkey between the members of the customs union, and does not cover maritime or air transport services. 165 The Turkish restrictions may, however, impair the free movement of goods and products. The EC-Turkey Association Council Decision No. 1/95 establishing the customs union provides that ''quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between the parties''. 166 This provision is to be inter-intra-Community trade''. 168 It thus covers all measures restricting the import of goods from other members of the customs union, including restrictions that may lead to an increase in transportation time and cost. 169 The closure of ports and airports to ships and aircraft registered in the Republic of Cyprus and to ships calling at harbours in southern Cyprus can impede the free movement of goods between members of the customs union. These restrictions cannot be justified on the grounds of Turkish public policy as they constitute ''a means of arbitrary discrimination'' against the Republic of Cyprus. 170 To the extent, and only to the extent, that the Turkish transport restrictions on the Republic of Cyprus affect the free movement of goods within the customs union, they are in breach of the Ankara Agreement and the related customs union. Where relevant, benchmarks will also include the fulfilment of commitments under the Association Agreement, in particular those pertaining to the EU-Turkey customs union and those that mirror requirements under the acquis.
II.C.ii. Scope of the Ankara Agreement
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The EU could choose to make the opening of ports a benchmark, e.g. for the opening and/ or closure of the chapters on free movement of goods (ch. 1) and customs union (ch. 29) and, possibly, the right of establishment and freedom to provide services (ch. 3) and transport policy (ch. 14). A precondition for such a benchmark would be a unanimous decision of the Council. It is thus not up to the Republic of Cyprus to establish such a benchmark. The Government of the Republic of Cyprus may, however, link the question of benchmarks with other questions on which it has a right of veto. So far, the ports issue has had no effect on the accessions process. On 20 October 2005, the European Commission started the process of screening Turkey's laws and regulations with regard to the 35 chapters of the acquis as a first step towards accession negotiations. The screening process included the chapters on customs union and free movement of goods, without giving rise to questions by the European Commission on the ports issue. 174 The conclusion of the screening process will mark the opening of negotiations on the individual chapters. The EU is in the driving seat with regard to the ports issue. It may fudge the issue for some time by deciding to deal with some less controversial chapters first, or it may make customs union or the free movement of goods one of the first chapters of the negotiations, thus bringing the matter to a head. However, the revision clause in the EU counter-declaration, committing the EU to monitor and evaluate full implementation of the Ankara Agreement in 2006, may force it to address the issue. This was underlined by EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn, who stated during an interview on 28 March 2006 that ''the commission is working to avoid a train crash at the end of the year. The Finnish presidency will have to use all its diplomatic skills, inherited from the period of neutral policy, to avoid this train crash. 
III. Conclusion
Nothing Turkey has done so far during the EU accession process implies its recognition of the Greek Cypriot-controlled Government of the Republic of Cyprus' claim to be the government of the whole of Cyprus. The opening of Turkish ports and airports to ships and aircraft flying the flag of the Republic of Cyprus would not amount to recognition, as the question of port and airport access does not allow any conclusion to be drawn as to the territorial sover- whole of Cyprus without at the same time ''de-recognizing'' the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and its government, and accepting the Greek Cypriot position that, contrary to the will of the Government of Republic of Cyprus, Turkey is occupying parts of the Republic of Cyprus. In Turkey, this would be widely seen as a betrayal of the Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish cause, and might bring down any government granting such recognition. The EU, on the other hand, has manoeuvred itself into a position where any Member State would be justified in halting the accession process on the basis of Turkey's non-recognition of the Republic of Cyprus or its non-implementation of the Ankara Agreement. By expressly linking the opening of negotiations on certain chapters with Turkey's implementation of the Ankara Agreement and by committing itself to evaluating full implementation in 2006, the EU has needlessly tied its hands. Even a limited opening of Turkish ports and airports without a simultaneous lifting of the restrictions on the Turkish Cypriots seems highly unlikely. Such a move would be viewed in Turkey as a humiliating political climb-down which would be difficult for any government to survive. The EU itself may be forced to implement its threat of not opening negotiations on certain chapters of the acquis in order not to lose credibility; a move which would affect the overall progress in the accession negotiations. Not opening or closing certain chapters of the negotiations will, however, only allow the two sides to buy time; it will not avoid the crash for which the two sides are heading. The European Parliament said in its resolution of 28 September 2005 that ''the objective of the negotiations is Turkish EU membership, but that the realisation of this ambition will depend on the efforts of both sides''
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-both sides need to make much more effort to settle the Cyprus problem if the Turkish ambition of EU membership is to be realized.
